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Abstract




1. Introduction and overview

Innovation-driven specialization in high-value adding activities has long been the central element of the strategies devised with the aim of reinvigorating the European competitiveness.​[1]​ While the promotion of the supply side of innovation has always been high on the agenda of both public policy and academic research, the other side of the coin used to be considered of secondary importance. Scholarly interest in commercialization and the market uptake of research results (CMU) increased only recently (see Grimaldi et al.’s survey, 2011), partly in the context of the wide-held belief in the much-debated ‘European Paradox’ (European Commission, 1995). According to the hypothesis advanced by this popular term, Europe plays a leading role in science but underperforms in terms of converting its top-level scientific output into commercial success and generating innovation-driven growth. 
As a consequence of heated debates on the European paradox (reviewed in Dosi et al., 2006; 2009) the issue of CMU also got to the forefront of policy agenda. Over the past 15 years a proliferation of policy measures can be observed aiming to support technology transfer and the commercialization of the results of scientific research; stimulate industry-academia collaborations and firms’ external knowledge exploitation and foster new technology-based entrepreneurship. Moreover, spectacular institutional development took place: a range of intermediary institutions were established to assist stakeholders in their commercialization efforts.
Furthermore, legislative and regulatory changes have been adopted to improve universities’ commercialization performance. Emulating – with considerable delay – the U.S. 1980 Bayh-Dole Act that granted the ownership right of intellectual property (IPR) originating from publicly funded university-based research to universities,​[2]​ European (and other OECD countries’) governments changed their IPR-regulation on academic patenting (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Other reform measures tried to integrate capital market-based features in European bank-based systems. These latter measures addressed the oft-mentioned explanatory factor of Europe’s observed innovation- and commercialization gaps: its bank-based system, considered inadequate for seizing the opportunities of today’s key enabling technologies (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2011; Martinsson, 2010). Over the past two decades significant convergence took place in Europe with respect to the adoption of some Anglo-Saxon specifics in corporate financing (Mullineux et al., 2011).
Despite legislative and regulatory reform and substantial public funding dedicated to enhance CMU in Europe, Europe’s perceived ‘commercialization gap’ vis-á-vis its main competitors has remained substantial (IUC, 2011). 
Since ‘user manuals’ of policy effectiveness contain rather general recommendations, such as bottom-up policy design, systemic and problem-oriented configuration of policy measures, cost-effectiveness, competitive allocation of support, due emphasis on each element of the ‘holy trinity’ of monitoring, evaluation, and policy learning (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2011), policy effectiveness can rather be improved by a systematic monitoring of peers’ best practices. Despite the limitations of policy emulation in different (e.g. economic, social, institutional and cultural) contexts, a comparative analysis of countries’ commercialization policy instruments may contribute to policy learning.
Hence, the objective of this paper is to survey and analyze a sample of CMU policy measures, and identify some common features of good practice. We rely on a case study based investigation, covering six European and four non-European CMU policy measures. 
Our discussion is structured in six sections. The next section surveys some explanatory factors of Europe’s perceived CMU gap. We argue that in addition to the usual market failure-type explanations, broader-based, systemic factors also account for Europe’s inferior-to-competitors performance. Section 3 briefly discusses some practical difficulties of policy design and the methodological difficulties of measuring commercialization performance. Section 4 presents the research method and the deriving limitations. The analysis of the commonalities of the surveyed cases is presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes and summarizes the general lessons of the cases. 
Before embarking on the analysis, the differences between the key commercialization-related terms need a short clarification. 
Technology transfer activities are concerned with the management of intellectual property related to codified knowledge. Knowledge transfer is a broader term: it encompasses all forms of knowledge (including people embodied tacit forms) transferred through a multiplicity of transfer channels. These latter include patenting and licensing or sale of intellectual property, spin-off creation, contract research, research sponsorship including firms’ financing of Ph.D. projects, consulting, research collaborations and co-publications, mobility agreements (temporary staff exchange, flow of university scientists to industry position), and sharing of R&D infrastructure. Commercialization in a narrow sense refers to the first two items of this list: to formal revenue generation from licensing, and to the commercial exploitation of university inventions through academic entrepreneurship: start-ups and spin-offs. 

2. Europe’s CMU-gap – some explanatory factors

Although a large number of scholars subscribe to the view that compared to Japan, Korea and in particular to the U.S., Europe is beset with problems of poor commercialization (reviewed by Dosi et al., 2006; 2009), this assumption is supported by precarious empirical evidence. One reason of the lacking substantiation is that the quantification of the ‘depth’ of the gap is a troublesome exercise. Measuring commercialization requires the compilation of currently non-existing data. The next section provides some details on the methodological difficulties of developing and using adequate indicators to measure countries’ and regions’ comparative commercialization performance, while this section surveys the literature on the explanatory factors of Europe’s perceived CMU-gap.
Analyses of the explanatory factors of Europe’s inferior-to-competitors commercialization performance usually list a variety of failures that hinder the translation of scientific results into commercial success (Arnold, 2004; Delanghe et al., 2009; Reid, 2009). Most of these failures however, apply also to Europe’s competitors: differences are manifest only in the effectiveness of policies that address them. Nevertheless, some specific failures are relevant mainly to Europe.
‘General failures’ include market failures, that make stakeholders allocate less resources to commercialization than socially optimal, e.g. because of information asymmetries, risks of poor appropriability. Furthermore, 
	actors’ capability failure: e.g. insufficient management competencies for leveraging the newly developed technologies; 
	network failures: e.g. insufficient number and poor quality of linkages, low trust, lock-in effects; 
	framework failures: imperfections in the market for technology; difficult access to innovation financing, for example to venture capital funding; 
	policy failures: inadequate governance, inadequate choice of instruments, lack of policy learning and adaptation 
are also relevant to both Europe and its competitors. Above and beyond the relative underperformance of the European innovation policy in addressing these problems, some systemic problems apply specifically to Europe. 
One is the relatively low number of science- and new technology-based, innovative, high-growth enterprises, as documented in Tyková et al., 2012. A related paper is Moncada-Paternó-Castello et al.’s (2010), who showed that company demographics – an overlooked factor in most ‘benchmarking innovation’ exercises also explains part of the U.S. long term advantage vis-à-vis Europe. While in the case of companies at the very top of the global R&D ranking there is no very big underinvestment gap vis-á-vis their U.S. and Japanese counterparts, the spread of R&D activities is much narrower in the EU. In Europe, a substantial proportion of business R&D is carried out by a relatively small number of firms the investment of which is not inferior to their U.S. counterparts. In contrast, in the U.S. there is a relatively large population of smaller companies that invests more strongly in R&D, and in a more consistent way than the EU companies.
This suggests a broad-based systemic failure-type explanation of the CMU gap, which claim is reinforced by Hege’s (2009) findings. Hege documented that U.S. venture capitalists generate significantly more value with their investments than their European counterparts. Although traditional explanations certainly apply, for example, about U.S. venture capital (VC) companies’ better capabilities and procedures: their sophisticated use of instruments of control, or the use of contingent funding, Hege identified an interesting phenomenon that complements the traditional explanations. Hege found that U.S. venture funds investing in Europe do not perform better than the European ones. Looking for explanations, he established that performance differences are accounted for mainly by poorly performing European companies: their share within VC funds’ portfolios is significantly larger in Europe than in the U.S. 
Another systemic failure is Europe’s fragmentation. Fragmentation is manifest in both the internal market itself and in selected market subsystems, for example in the VC-sector, where jurisdiction (e.g. bankruptcy law) and regulations differ across member states. This prevents the rapid increase of cross border VC-investments (Tyková et al., 2012). 
These hard-to-eliminate failures predict no rapid improvement in Europe’s comparative commercialization performance. At least, as it will be explained in the subsequent section, increased policy attention to commercialization and the launching of new CMU-related policy measures may not necessarily yield the expected results. Moreover, since the quantification of the size of the actual gap is coupled with substantial methodological difficulties, the measurement of any plausible performance improvement will equally present hardly surmountable challenges.

3. Practical problems, methodological and measurement difficulties

Policy-makers often encounter a number of unexpected problems when introducing newly-designed innovation policy instruments. Even if they address well-identified problems Borrás and Edquist’s (2013) and try to fix the perceived failures, ex-post evaluation exercises may document inferior-to expectations outcomes, since target-groups’ properties and their external environment may change rapidly. Moreover, problems ought to be addressed not by single policy instruments, since each policy measure exerts an impact in conjunction with other instruments: within the policy mix (Flanagan et al., 2011). Consequently, the policy mix, the interplay of instruments is also a crucial explanatory factor of policy performance.
The incorporation of the demand-side approach​[3]​ into STI policy mix represents a telling example that substantiates the importance of the ‘policy mix’ factor. While the recognition of demand-based policy instruments as effective enablers of both innovation generation and adoption (Aho et al., 2006; Arora et al., 2001; Di Stefano et al., 2012) has also contributed to the rise of CMU policies to the top of the innovation policy agenda, several analysts warned that additional emphasis on demand-side policies will intensify governance difficulties (e.g. OECD, 2011a, Edler et al., 2012) or cause policy misalignment (Bodas Freitas and von Tunzelmann, 2008). 
Governance difficulties originate in the relative novelty (from institutional viewpoint) of demand-side policies in an innovation system traditionally concerned only with the supply-side. The main hurdle is not the design of novel demand-side measures and their integration into the policy mix, rather the high dispersion of actors and institutions that are in principle responsible for the deployment of demand-side measures. While in the case of STI policies that affect the supply side of R&D, policy development and implementation is usually concentrated in one or in a couple of ministries (Izsák and Edler, 2011), demand side policies may be conceived and implemented by a variety of dispersed institutions, and distributed agents. Consequently policy learning and policy innovations (e.g. new governance arrangements) are required to cope with increased coordination challenges.
As a matter of fact, the integration of a bunch of policy measures tailored to promote new objectives will necessarily require the redesign of the policy system. Demand-side measures have to be compatible not only with STI policy instruments that address the supply side of innovation, but with instruments and objectives pertaining to competition policy, social policy, fiscal policy, trade policy, sectoral policies (e.g. transport policy, energy policy), regional development policy and so forth. In short, integration of a new element into a system (into the policy mix) will necessarily change the system itself: it modifies the interrelations of the individual components; it causes problems of incompatibility and intensifies the risks of trade-offs.
When looking for indicators to quantify Europe’s CMU gap, data published in the Innovation Union Competitiveness Report (IUC, 2011) or in OECD Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard (OECD, 2011) are both good points of departure for analysis. 
A closer scrutiny of cross-country comparisons in these publications reveals that there are few indicators that can be applied to measure specifically CMU performance. The published indicators – individual components of the composite innovation index – focus rather on the input sides of innovation, or are concerned with broader, competitiveness-type factors (e.g. knowledge-intensive services exports; share of innovative SMEs, share of fast growing innovative firms), or with the explanatory factors of underperformance (e.g. availability of venture capital; availability of public support).
Output indicators such as patents and scientific publications are seemingly more relevant for CMU performance. Considering however, that a voluminous literature documents that only a fraction of patents is commercially exploited and that the direct costs of IPR may even exceed the revenues (Andersen and Rossi, 2012; Henderson et al., 1998) it is fair to claim that even these indicators quantify in reality invention-type outputs, rather than CMU-type outputs. Consequently, their use as proxies for Europe’s CMU gap is not straightforward.
Other, seemingly relevant indicators include ‘public-private co-publications per million of population’, or ‘percentage of firms collaborating with the public academic sector, as a percentage of innovative firms’. These indicators do not reveal much about CMU performance, at least not directly. They quantify the intensity of science-industry links consequently they can rather be used as proxies for stakeholders’ commitment to engage in innovation collaboration. Collaboration may or may not result in inventions, and these inventions may or may not be commercialized. 
The ‘share of private sector funding of R&D carried out by public research organizations, as a percentage of total R&D performed in this sector’ seems a useful indicator from CMU point of view. However, similarly to the previously analyzed indicators, it can also be considered as an input proxy of innovation, rather than a par excellence commercialization measure: it is, at best, a proxy of the presence of market pull drivers of technology transfer. 
Another factor that distorts the quantification and benchmarking exercises based on this indicator is the ‘more is better assumption’, used originally in Schibany and Streicher (2008) in their review and criticism of the ‘Summary Innovation Index of the European Innovation Scoreboard. It cannot be safely claimed that the higher the share of private sector funding of R&D carried out by public research organizations, the better. For example, fiscal austerity measures and the withdrawal of the state from funding R&D will greatly enhance the value of this indicator, which, in turn will not reflect a favorable development.
Further indicators commonly examined to quantify countries’ commercialization performance include ‘license and patent revenues from abroad as percent of GDP’; the number of university spin-offs and technology-intensive start-ups; or the share of young innovative companies within the total corporate population. The problem with the first indicator is that it quantifies only part of patent holders’ (e.g. universities’) technology transfer-specific income and disregards for example income from consulting, from mobility agreements and from the sharing of R&D infrastructure. Note that Andersen and Rossi (2012) found that collaborative research projects, including consultancies, are a more important source of income for many universities than licensing.
The problem with entrepreneurship-related indicators is that no systematic data compilation exists about their survival rate and about their growth performance, which occurs usually with considerable time-lag, if at all. This deficiency can partly be compensated for, if another indicator is also considered: the number of initial public offerings in high-technology sectors. The evolution of this indicator may however also be distorted by cyclical factors and crises: note that the evolution of several European newly created stock markets (NASDAQ-copies for high-technology firms) came to an abrupt halt following the Internet bubble crash in the early 2000s (Revest-Sapio, 2012).
The most systematic theoretical exercise to develop a new CMU model was carried out by Hawkings et al., 2007 and Langford et al., 2006. The authors distinguished R&D outputs from the outcomes of R&D undertakings, classifying invention disclosures and patents into the first and license revenues into the second category. Similarly, publications belong to the first category and new scientific methods that emerged as a result of the findings described in the given publication, belong to the second. 
In addition to R&D outputs and outcomes, a third category analysts have to deal with is the economic impact deriving from outputs: improved macroeconomic, environmental or societal indicators. Spin-off creation for example, may be classified as an outcome of R&D undertakings, while the number of employees and total revenues generated by spin-off companies, as well as the value of university equity holdings in spin-offs belong to the third category. Similarly, elaboration of a new process technology is an outcome of R&D, while cost savings, improved energy efficiency, and productivity increase that result from the use of the new process technology belong to the category of economic impact. 
In summary, since the proper measurement of commercialization performance is lacking, neither the magnitude of Europe’s commercialization gap, nor the performance improvement impact of policy interventions can be reliably estimated (Arundel and Bordoy, 2008). Hence, Europe’s CMU-gap remains a perception, based on anecdotal evidence. Much additional research: theory development, methodological efforts and statistical data compilation are required for benchmarking countries’ CMU performance. 
This is however not the focus of this paper: here we examine a sample of policy measures adopted with the objective of enhancing innovation stakeholders’ commercialization performance. We try to identify what makes policy deliver, and sort out some general common features of the surveyed cases.

4. Research methodology and limitations

The case study investigation that constitutes the empirical basis of this paper was started in the framework of a research project carried out for the European Commission​[4]​ involving analysis of good practice CMU policy instruments. The author of this paper prepared the case studies over the period between March and May 2013. This initial stock of evidence was complemented with desk research on six additional policy measures (table 1).
For the selection of the sample we applied the following procedure. Drawing on Erawatch’s inventory​[5]​ of innovation support measures, we first identified the ones that were relevant from the point of view of commercialization: designed to meet one or several of the following policy objectives: support to 1) knowledge transfer and the commercialization of public research results; 2) public-private research collaboration; 3) sectoral innovation in manufacturing and the commercial applications of applied research results; 4) technology transfer and innovation collaboration between firms; 5) establishment of innovative start-ups; 6) innovative stakeholders’ access to funding and particularly to risk capital; 7) scale-up of initial commercialization results and move from the prototype phase towards market uptake (demonstration projects, pilot plants and living labs); 8) diffusion of innovative technologies. We included one additional category, that of 9) innovative public procurement.​[6]​
Our case studies investigated the objectives, policy rationales, sectoral orientation, funding modalities and impact of the selected measures as well as the evolution of these factors. We tried to identify the reasons behind the efficiency (or the relative underperformance) of the given measures, whether they lie in policy design, budget, or in the country/target group specifics. 
The cases were selected on the basis that they encompass each of the above-identified categories and be located in a variety of European and non-European countries. We tried to select policy measures with respect to which abundant information was available (impact analysis, evaluation reports, success stories). Another selection criterion was the minimum threshold budget of € 5 million annually. Furthermore, we opted for policy schemes, with no end date foreseen. In addition to established schemes going on for more than half a decade, we included some recently introduced policy measures as well.

Table 1 around here

Table 1 makes it clear that programme objectives are quite heterogeneous, and programmes are spanning multiple industries and technologies. Most programmes try to incorporate several, albeit related policy objectives at the same time. Annual budgets are also divergent: while all of them exceed the minimum threshold established as selection criterion (€ 5 million), the budget of some measures (e.g. KOTEC; A-STEP, SBIR) is by orders of magnitude higher than that of other measures. Moreover, the socio-economic and institutional contexts which shape the framework conditions of stakeholders’ activities are also dissimilar. 
This heterogeneity raises serious doubts about the generalisation of the results of this comparative survey. Moreover, there is no independent evaluation available in the case of each of the surveyed policy instruments, confirming that they are really ‘good practice’.​[7]​ These limitations notwithstanding, the common features of the surveyed cases presented in the next section are thought-provoking and elicit substantial policy learning. 

5. Common features of the selected good practice cases
5.1 Specific or broad-based policy design?

The first conspicuous commonality of several of the surveyed instruments was that policy-makers stipulated well-defined, specific objectives, to be achieved with the help of the given measure. The well-formulated, detailed policy objectives suggested that policy-makers have a clear concept of 1) what they want to achieve; 2) the ways to achieve the objectives and 3) the potential users of the results. 
Information for policy design was in most of the surveyed cases compiled in a bottom-up manner, involving both the representatives of the potential target groups and policy designers at various levels of public policy. 
The history of the Japanese ‘Industrial Technology Development Programme’ launched by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) exemplifies the bottom-up approach specific policy instruments are conceived with. 
Following extensive information collection activities: foresight studies; interviews with industry experts on technological trends and industry’s needs; consultation with the academia about research endeavours that may fulfil industry needs; and about the feasibility and the perspectives of some proposed research projects, NEDO’s experts together with ministry (Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) officials and cabinet office representatives identified critical medium-, and longer-term research and development issues. They set R&D targets and developed programmes that contribute to the achievement of these targets. Planning also considered the issue of commercialization: intellectual property (IP) strategies were designed in the planning period. The ‘Industrial Technology Development Programme’ was the result of this long planning and programming exercise. The calls of this programme contained highly specific objectives, for example technology development of next-generation high-efficiency and high-quality lighting; development of extremely low-power circuits and systems; shifting from petrol to biomass in the chemical industry to reduce petrol consumption; rare metal substitute materials development.
Similarly, before launching the Catapult Centres programme, the UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB) invited stakeholders’ views​[8]​ – not only on relevant technology areas, but also on management and governance arrangements they considered as optimal. Drawing on stakeholders’ inputs gained in a series of consultations and workshops, TSB prepared the mid-term strategy of the new centres: how they ought to complement existing innovation infrastructure, how their outreach is ensured, how they fill the space between ‘concept’ and ‘commercialization’. TSB identified the key priority technological areas in which the new centres should be established. In turn, each centre prepared its own strategy and communicated the ways they work with business (for example through funding of specific projects; through ensuring access to capital equipment and infrastructure; through mediating access to knowledge transfer networks, or to innovation finance providers. 
As a result of these bottom-up policy design exercises, several of the surveyed programmes featured highly specific objectives. In addition to the above-detailed cases, the Austrian ‘Technologies for Sustainable Development’ programme also features very specific objectives such as low-energy and environmentally sustainable buildings. Calls for proposals of the U.S. SBIR programme are also structured around specific problems that need to be solved. The Finnish Electric Vehicle Systems Programme’s objective was the diffusion of electric vehicles through demonstration projects and testing platforms. The sub-projects, such as the ‘development of electric snowmobile’; ‘electric vehicle charging infrastructure for urban environment’; ‘eBus: Testbed for Development’; ‘eStorage – battery systems’, were communicated in a systematic manner: they identified the need that requires R&D (what policy intends to achieve); the solution (the funded research projects and the supported demonstration programmes), and the expected benefits together with the potential users of the results. 
Nevertheless broadly formulated programmes cannot be automatically labelled as ones without any strategic vision. As stated in a Swedish Innovation Agency publication (Elg and Håkansson, 2012), open calls breed creativity and lead to the emergence of ideas with the help of which new priorities can be formulated. It is important that policy-makers and supporting organisations do not get stuck in existing paradigms, or do not serve only the existing needs of industry; and do not fund only the continuation and enhancement of existing research directions. Programmes need to be formulated in a way to serve as agents of change, and foster renewal through addressing new areas of knowledge. Hence, part of the STI budget needs to be earmarked for broadly formulated ‘support of new research directions’. 




A common feature of the surveyed policy measures was that the financial support provided in the framework of most of the surveyed programmes was allocated together with complementary services. In this way, the surveyed CMU policy instruments have not only fostered narrowly defined CMU-specific activities, but have also contributed to the accumulation of complementary assets, indispensable for capturing value.​[10]​ Complementary services have, in a way, accompanied the recipients of the given programmes’ core support to further stages in the business development cycle.
The Korean loan guarantee programme, for example, is accompanied by technology appraisal, venture certification, consultancy services and mediation of technology agreements and technology transfers. Among these complementary services, technology appraisal and certification proved highly valuable for an increasing number of stakeholders in the Korean innovation system. The Korean Finance and Technology Corporation’s (KOTEC) technology appraisal is carried out with the help of a non-financial appraisal model that combines technology valuation and business feasibility / business potential valuation. KOTEC’s methodology of assessing the value of individual indicators, and calculating the summary technology rating grade (the weighting of these indicators) is protected by patent. The indicators considered include
	the technological ability of the applicant, i.e. his/its technology management ability and R&D ability; 
	the value of the technology, (technological superiority, or ‘degree of technological extension’); 
	marketability and the potential size of the market; 
	business prospects; 
	profit prospects; 
	the related risks. 

The novelty and the value added of KOTEC’s appraisal system lie in the fact that the usual problem impeding commercialization: that individual stakeholders have a good understanding of either the technology or of the business potential – is present also in support organisations and in financial institutions. A reliable certificate of the potential value of the technology and of its business feasibility / business potential is therefore extremely valuable: it reduces the common information asymmetries that are otherwise the main barriers of new technology-oriented business development. It is by no surprise that KOTEC’s appraisal has been extensively used by public R&D support organisations for selecting the recipients of various innovation-, SME-, and commercialization support schemes. Appraisal is provided also as a service that precedes companies' listing on KOSDAQ market.
Beneficiaries of CMU programmes in other countries could also benefit from various complementary services, such as business consultancy, coaching and capability building for efficient innovation management, or consultancy on IPR issues, support to the identification of suitable business partners. The experts of the public innovation intermediaries, e.g. Enterprise Ireland; Tekes, Finland; Design Council, UK; Austrian Research Promotion Agency, Japan Science and Technology Agency, evaluated the commercial potential of the scientific results and helped grantees to elaborate IPR and commercialization strategies. Experts and grantees jointly decided about the adequate commercialization channel (licensing, or start-up formation, contract research). Once this latter decision had been taken, innovation agencies offered channel-specific services: if start-up formation was the decided commercialization mode, academic entrepreneurs were offered consultancy services with respect to the design of the business plan. The agencies assisted beneficiaries also by building and mediating linkages to third party funding providers. 
If contract research or collaboration with industry was the chosen commercialization channel, the experts of the public intermediary organizations provided linkage building services to detect potential industrial partners: they organised business meetings and university technology exhibitions.




A recurring element in the impact evaluations of the surveyed policy measures was that support recipients became later eligible for other types of support. Support recipients actively participated in further rounds of the given scheme and/or in related regional, national or supra-national programmes. 
The phenomenon of repeated funding of the same recipient is related to the debates on the so-called Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) of public subsidy allocation, namely that initial advantage (in our case: public subsidy allocation to support specific firms’ R&D activities) begets further advantage: there is an observed persistence in the allocation of support to past recipients (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013). 
The latter authors emphasise that this persistence is not always the result of information asymmetries that make funding agencies’ grant provision become based on the reputation of applicants rather than on the merit of the given proposal. The authors make a case for a ‘virtuous Matthew effect’, in which repeated subsidy allocation is a condition of success. The virtuous Matthew effect denotes the knowledge and competence accumulation of past recipients, who in fact necessitate repeated support so that their initial developments attain an elevated stage of technology readiness or surpass the prototype phase and be scaled up.
The recognition of the virtuous Matthew effect has been incorporated into the design of some of the surveyed policy measures, by making the support gained in previous rounds/phases of the scheme a criterion of support allocation.
For example, the Austrian ‘Technologies for Sustainable Development’ programme’s calls emphasised the cumulative nature of the programme. If a submitted proposal intends to build on the results of past projects carried out in the framework of previous rounds, and elaborate on them – this is considered an asset.
The Japanese A-STEP programme – that supports industry-academia collaboration – is characterised by stage-based contingent funding: support recipients of the ‘feasibility study stage’ may later qualify for additional, larger-scale support in the so-called ‘full R&D stage’. A-STEP’s programme design emulates thereby the highly successful U.S. SBIR programme, where Phase 1 awardees (who got support for proof of concept) could qualify for Phase 2 (full R&D) support. Later, in Phase 3 (commercialization) the same recipients may get support from other agencies (Audretsch, 2003). 

5.4	Spanning several stages of the innovation cycle

A noticeable commonality of the surveyed cases was that they span several stages in the innovation cycle. Although the surveyed policy measures were all targeting CMU, our investigations revealed that recipients’ R&D activity was also supported to some extent. Support was provided both to the initial stage of the commercialization process: proof-of-concept; implementation of prototypes, or test devices; pre-clinical drug trials; and to later stages: commercial application (actual commercial product, actual device, clinical trial). Policy measures recognised that both commercialization stages necessitate additional research and development activities, hence, most of the surveyed CMU measures also addressed R&D activities.
This underlines the well-known thesis of innovation economics that R&D is not a separate stage that precedes commercialization (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986): the two stages are deeply intertwined in the innovation process through multiple feedback loops. Furthermore, this reflects the recognition that the valley of death between research and commercial application is not one single valley, rather a series of valleys. Outputs in one stage of the innovation cycle (e.g. IP, prototype, new product, new venture, spin-off company) immediately trigger demand for new types of support that facilitate activities in the subsequent stage of the cycle. 
By designing policy measures that span several stages of the innovation cycle or by systematically combining multiple policy measures that address subsequent stages of the cycle, the bureaucratic procedure of support allocation can be shortened. Consequently, the time-to-market requirement of new product development – a critical factor for commercialization success – is not jeopardised by long bidding procedures.
The primary example of stage-spanning measures is the U.S. SBIR programme, where participation is organised in ‘phases’ and only Phase I awardees are entitled to apply for Phase II funding. Accordingly, only if the technical merit, feasibility and commercial potential of the proposed R&D effort is validated (this is what funding can be applied for) can applicants submit proposals for Phase II funding. In this (later) stage of the commercialization process, funding targets demonstration activities such as testing, prototype, scale-up studies, design, performance verification of test products ( Audretsch and Aldridge, 2014). 
Emulating the successful U.S. practice of early-stage financing through government procurement several countries have introduced similar schemes, including Korea (KOSBIR), the UK (Small Business Research Initiative), and even Europe’s Horizon 2020 includes a new SME instrument, building on the SBIR model (Audretsch and Aldridge, 2014).
The Japanese A-Step programme is another example of stage-spanning programmes. At the IPR stage of the university invention, for example, support is provided to the preparation of a feasibility study: the experts of the programme’s funding and administering body (Japan Science and Technology Agency) evaluate the practical applicability of the given basic research output. They validate whether the research undertaking in question has a technology transfer potential and whether the research output meets potential collaborating companies’ needs. Another audit investigates, whether a university spin-off company would be a good channel of commercialization. At a later stage, the programme supports applied R&D carried out in science–industry collaboration. Once applied R&D bears fruit (prototype stage), R&D activities that aim to test the new product may obtain support. Finally, if the chosen commercialization channel is university-based start-up venture formation, support can be obtained to cover the costs of the first commercial activities. 
In the UK, two policy measures are formally combined to span multiple stages in the innovation cycle. The Catapult Centres Programme focuses on the translation of research into products and services (technology transfer stage) through science-industry collaboration in technology and innovation centres. The Design Leadership Programme offers businesses and university scientists a package of support and coaching with the help of which companies can boost the sales of their new, innovative products and enter new markets. The latter policy measure focuses on one of the last stages in the innovation cycle, in which technological innovation and design for innovation are combined to maximise IP value and improve the marketability of new products. 
Recognising that design is a cross-cutting theme within general innovation and CMU strategies, the concept has been formally integrated within the role and mission of the Catapults. In the framework of the Design Leadership Programme, the experts (associates) of the UK Design Council collaborate with individual Catapult Centres to address particular challenges (e.g. with respect to product branding, product and packaging design) in the commercialization process of the products and technologies developed within the centres.

5.5 Policy learning 

The surveyed policy instruments – even the relatively new, emerging ones – have all been evolving for longer or shorter periods. 
Policy learning and the occasional rearrangement of the programmes were notable commonalities of the surveyed successful cases. They were characterised by the dialectics of continuity and change. 
The evolution of the instruments was the result of repeated monitoring; policy and project evaluation exercises, and expert advice that considered 1) what worked and what did not; 2) changes in target groups’ environment; 3) changes in policy priorities and 4) emerging new priorities. Following the feedbacks, decision-makers kept refining their selection and evaluation methods, got better acquainted with target group characteristics, as well as with the in-built bottlenecks of the given policy instruments. In an effort to unblock or mitigate the newly identified bottlenecks they kept diversifying their portfolio of complementary services, or adapted the measures themselves to overcome the barriers that had been discovered during the policy implementation process. Over time this resulted in significantly improved policy delivery.
Two analogies come to observers’ mind. Firstly, that similarly to path breaking innovations, effective policy instruments are not ‘born fully armed’ either (like Pallas Athena): it takes time they develop (through feedbacks, learning and policy refinement) to become a success story. Secondly, Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) remarks, applied originally to economic development, can be paraphrased with respect to successful policy measures: STI and CMU policy development is a process of self-discovery.

6. Conclusions and lessons

This paper tried to deepen our understanding on success factors of CMU policy instruments, by comparing and analysing selected support programmes within and outside Europe that aim to foster the commercialization and the market uptake of research results.
We argued that in the context of idea-based growth (Jones, 2005), countries are exploring new ways to support the translation of new ideas into technological and economically viable innovations. The impact of newly introduced policy measures may however be inferior to expectations, which necessitates a continuous monitoring of peers’ best practices. 
A general lesson of the surveyed cases is that policy support transcends simple subsidy provision. Effective innovation agencies evolve from support providers to system enablers, by combining core support and complementary services provision. In addition to financial support, they offer a range of soft resources – out of which agencies’ market knowledge and network are of particular importance. ‘System enabler’ governmental agencies embed support recipients in a complex network each constituent of which provides indispensable inputs to the given commercialization undertaking. This network includes corporate partners, industry experts who advise on practical issues; knowledge transfer networks; professional business support providers that give assistance on IPR, legal or financial issues; financing organisations; scientists, engineering experts, university research departments, trade associations, clusters and so forth. 
The survey of the individual measures and the evolution thereof recalls a classical reference work discussing the factors behind the East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993). According to the referred study, one explanatory factor of the East Asian success was the competence of these countries’ high-quality bureaucracies that conceived, administered and managed the states’ intervention programmes. This thesis perfectly applies to the surveyed cases, particularly to the Asian ones. Successful policy instruments necessitate a large stock of expertise, for example with respect to the necessary amount of funding that provides the required impetus but does not distort competition or induce moral hazard. They require knowledge of both the market and the technology. Decision-makers have to be familiar with the features of the business environment of each project they select to support. As a matter of fact, the magnitude of the investment necessary to build up the required stock of expertise in public innovation intermediaries is frequently underestimated.
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Table 1: Short description of the surveyed measures

Name	Agency/Country	Purpose*	Implementation date
Technologies for Sustainable Development	Austrian Research Promotion Agency, Austria	3,7,8	2000 –
A-STEP: Adaptable and Seamless Technology Transfer Program through Target-Driven R&D 	Japan Science and Technology Agency, Japan	1,2,4,5	2009 –
Industrial Technology Development Programme	New Energy and Industrial Development Technology Organization, Japan	2,3,4	2008 –
KOTEC Loan Guarantee Scheme 	KOTEC: Korea Finance and Technology Corporation, Korea	6	1990 –
Electric Vehicle Systems Programme	Tekes, Finland	2,3,7,8	2011 –
BioRefine Programme	Tekes, Finland	2,3,7,8	2007 –
Commercialization Fund	Enterprise Ireland, Ireland	1,2,5,7 	2003 –
Catapult Centres	Technology Strategy Board, UK	1,2,5,7	2010 –
Design Leadership Programme	Design Council, UK	3,8	2007 –
Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)	Small Business Administration (inter-departmental), U.S.	2,3,5,7,9	1982 –










^1	  See the annual European Competitiveness Reports (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/competitiveness-analysis/european-competitiveness-report/index_en.htm). 
^2	  There is voluminous literature on the spectacular changes the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act brought to U.S. universities’ technology commercialization performance (surveyed by Grimaldi et al., 2011). The Act has effectively changed university culture (referred to by Etzkowitz et al., 2000 as the ‘second academic revolution’) and gave rise to the emergence of universities’ third mission: entrepreneurship – in addition to education and research.
^3	  Demand-based innovation policy includes public procurement related measures, measures that stimulate private demand, measures that shape demand through regulations and industry standards, and some systemic programmes, e.g. lead market initiatives and support to user centred innovations (classification by Izsák and Edler, 2011, p. 6.).
^4	  Research was prepared under the Framework Contract ENTR/2009/033.
^5	  ERAWATCH is the European Commission's information platform on European, national and regional research and innovation systems and policies (http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu). It provides information among others on research and innovation policy support measures implemented by national governments in 61 countries.
^6	  This methodology and the above categories were elaborated by IDEA Consult, the coordinator of the research project carried out for the European Commission (coordinator: Vincent Duchene). The categories applied originally included two more items: support to IPR-issues, and support to the innovative use of standards. The research team obtained altogether 313 measures (in 31 countries: EU27, USA, Japan, Korea, and China), and selected 20 of them to prepare detailed case studies. This paper draws exclusively on the case studies prepared by the author.
^7	  Some of the measures, in particular SBIR, have been subject of substantial scholarly interest and to a number of evaluations (see survey by Audretsch and Aldridge, 2014). In the case of other measures only implementation progress reports are available, and/or descriptions of a couple of success stories. 
^8	  Stakeholders were defined in the broadest possible sense, involving business and research communities, the public administration, and representatives of various innovation supporting organisations.
^9	  See e.g. annual reports of Enterprise Ireland; Forfás, Science Foundation Ireland.
^10	  Recall Teece’s (1986) classical argument, that the ownership of complementary assets will determine who captures value from innovations.
